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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the effect of dual-class shares on firm performance using a unique law 
change in Switzerland as a source of exogenous variation. Unlike most of the related literature 
we do not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach but allow the effect to vary depending on a firm’s 
need for external finance. Based on nine years panel data of both firms affected and 
unaffected by the law change, we find that dual-class shares neither harm nor benefit firm 
performance on average. However, dual-class shares increase firm performance if the firm 
requires external finance and dual-class shares decrease firm performance if the firm does not 
require external finance.  
  
Keywords:  Corporate Governance, Dual-class Shares, Agency Theory, Stewardship 
Theory, Shareholder Value, Natural Experiment   
                                                
 
*  Stephan Nüesch, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 
Zürich, Switzerland, phone: +41 44 634 29 14, email: stephan.nuesch@business.uzh.ch. 
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Brian Boyd, Will Mitchell, Pei Sung, participants at the 2011 Strategic 
Management Society Conference in Miami and seminar participants at the University of Konstanz for helpful 
comments. Data collection support from Stefan Hungerbühler and Nadine Trindler is gratefully 
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773206
2 
INTRODUCTION 
If firms deviate from a one-share-one-vote principle by assigning disproportional voting 
rights to different classes of shares, dual-class shares emerge. While it seems natural that 
shareholders who provide equal amounts of equity should have equal opportunity to influence 
firm decisions, dual-class shares are frequent in reality. 35% of the 300 largest European 
firms have dual-class shares (Deminor Rating, 2005). In North America, the fraction of listed 
firms with dual-class shares is about 6 percent in the U.S. (Gompers, Ishi, & Metrick, 2010) 
and 15 percent in Canada (Jog, Zhu, & Dutta, 2010).  
Dual-class shares create disproportionality between voting rights and cash flow rights. 
Prominent examples of firms with dual-class shares are Ford, Berkshire Hathaway, Google, 
and Facebook. Ford’s dual-class equity structure allows the Ford family to control 40 percent 
of the firm’s voting rights with only about 4 percent of the total equity in the firm. Warren 
Buffet, the majority shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway, holds shares with 200 times the 
voting right and (only) 30 times the cash flow right of ordinary shares (McClure, 2012). By 
holding shares with ten votes each share, the founders of Google (Sergey Brin and Larry 
Page) and the (former) CEO Eric Schmidt control two-thirds of the voting power, even 
though they own only one third of shares outstanding (Mills, 2006). A very similar equity 
structure puts Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of Facebook, in total command even 
after going public. Dual-class equity is typically created to help founders and other dominant 
owners to expand the firm without losing much control. The dominant owners, which we 
denote controlling shareholders in this study, typically concentrate their holdings in shares 
with superior voting rights, whereas minority shareholder primarily hold shares with inferior 
voting rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2009; Lauterbach & Yafeh, 
2011).   
The effect of dual-class shares on firm performance is controversial. Opponents of dual-
class equity argue that dual-class equity allows controlling shareholders to extract private 
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benefits with few consequences (Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988; Masulis, 
Wang, & Xie, 2009). Others, however, argue that dual-class equity is a value-enhancing 
governance structure because it helps controlling shareholders to pursue a long-term value 
creation strategy without fearing that short-term oriented raiders acquire the firm. As dual-
class shares act as an anti-takeover device, they encourage incumbent managers to make firm-
specific investments (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1985; Lehn, Netter, & Poulsen, 1992). 
The empirical literature is yet to establish if and how dual-class shares affect firm value. 
The cumulative findings about the performance consequences of dual-class equity have been 
weak and/or inconsistent (for a review of the literature see Adams and Ferreira, 2007). 
One difficulty in establishing a link between dual-class shares and firm performance is 
the endogeneity of a firm’s equity structure. Endogeneity is a constant challenge to empirical 
corporate governance studies (e.g., Larcker, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2011) and a major issue 
when identifying the causal effect of dual-class shares on firm performance (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2007; Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010). Firm performance and the equity structure are 
jointly determined. Omitted variables are therefore likely to affect both a firm’s equity 
structure and performance, leading to spurious results. For example, incapable managers 
decrease firm performance by making bad decisions. At the same time, incapable managers 
may try to safeguard their position by issuing and holding shares with superior voting rights 
(Masulis et al., 2009). 
Two recent studies (Gompers et al., 2010; Jog et al., 2010) address the endogeneity 
problem by using instrumental variables for dual-class shares. Both studies use a binary 
variable coded one when the founding family’s name appears in the firm’s name and a second 
variable coded one for firms in the media industry as instruments. However, these instruments 
are likely to affect firm performance beyond their influence on dual-class shares and, 
therefore, do not fulfill the exogeneity condition (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Bennedsen & 
Nielsen, 2010). Family firms are often found to have different performances than other firms 
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(e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and media firms operate in a specific environment that may 
cause performance trends to be different than for firms in other industries. This study employs 
a law change in Switzerland as a natural experiment1 to mitigate the endogeneity problem. On 
October 4, 1991 the Swiss Parliament adopted a new corporation law (“Aktiengesetz”) that 
removed specific advantages of having non-voting shares (NVS) in addition to voting shares: 
flexible issue of new shares and share buybacks and no minimum face value. Unlike with 
voting shares, no shareholder approval had been needed when increasing non-voting stock 
and firms had been able to buyback their NVS but not their voting shares. There had also been 
no minimum face value for NVS under the previous law. The new corporation law introduced 
a minimum face value for NVS, decreased the minimum face value for voting shares, and 
permitted buybacks for voting shares so that firms no longer have to resort to NVS for 
buybacks. As a result, the proportion of Swiss firms with NVS dropped from 47 percent in 
1990 to 23 percent in 1994. We employ the law change as a source of exogenous variation in 
dual-class equity and identify the performance effects from panel data of both firms that are 
affected and firms that are unaffected by the law change, taking firm fixed effects and time-
varying controls into account.2 
A second difficulty in establishing a link between dual-class shares and firm performance 
is that one-size-does-not-fit-all. The effect of dual-class shares on a firm’s performance is 
unlikely to be universally the same for all firms. It is not surprising that analyses seeking a 
universal effect yield weak and/or inconsistent results (e.g., Lins, 2003; Dimitrov & Jain, 
2006; Gompers et al., 2010, Jog et al., 2010). From the rich body of related empirical research 
                                                
 
1 Recently, natural experiments have become an increasingly popular way to identify causal effects in 
corporate governance studies. Giannetti and Laeven (2008) tested the influence of ownership concentration 
on firm performance using a Swedish pension reform as a natural experiment. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 
(2010) employed a Delaware Chancery Court ruling as a natural experiment to test the influence of staggered 
boards on share prices. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) used the board regulations of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 to estimate the effect of board independence on performance.   
2  Adams and Ferreira (2007) consider a combination of natural experiments and firm fixed effects as the gold 
standard for research on the effects of dual-class equity on firm performance. Natural experiments create 
sufficient within-firm variation for identification and firm fixed effects make the exogeneity assumption of 
the treatment assignment credible.  
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only three studies (Masulis et al., 2009; Hoi & Robin, 2010; Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010) 
have explored dual-class equity from a contingency perspective. This study extends the scarce 
contingency literature on the performance effects of dual-class equity by investigating the 
moderating influence of a firm’s external financing needs. If a firm’s internal cash flow 
exceeds profitable investment opportunities, the firm does not require external capital and 
monitoring by the capital markets is weak (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1984). This intensifies 
the potential agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. 
The main finding of this study is that dual-class shares neither increase nor decrease a 
firm’s Tobin’s q and return on asset (ROA) on average, but that a firm’s external financing 
needs significantly moderate the relationship between dual-class shares and firm performance. 
As expected, we find that dual-class equity is associated with significantly better performance 
if a firm needs external finance, and with significantly worse performance if a firm does not 
need external finance.   
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In the next section, we give an 
overview of the theory and present testable hypotheses. We then explain the quasi-
experimental setup and the institutional background of this study. Subsequently, we describe 
the data, the identification strategy, and present the empirical evidence. Finally, we discuss 
our results and conclude.  
 
THEORY AND HYOPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Negative View on Dual-Class Shares 
The negative view on dual-class shares is rooted in agency theory. Agency theory describes 
the costs associated with the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Vishny & Shleifer, 1997). Controlling shareholders exercise direct or indirect control over the 
firm. Minority shareholders, while participating in the ownership of the firm, have little to 
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say. Agency costs in this context arise if controlling shareholders pursue their own interests 
that conflict with the interests of minority shareholders.  
If controlling shareholders have disproportionally more voting rights than cash flow 
rights, they bear a smaller proportion of the financial consequences of their decisions while 
having a greater ability to extract private benefits (Masulis et al., 2009). In addition, dual-
class shares protect entrenched controllers against the market for corporate control. Overall, 
dual-class shares reduce the costs of consuming perquisites and enjoying private benefits and 
therefore intensifies the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Burkart & Lee, 2008).  
Assuming self-interested individuals and a setting where the controlling shareholders 
obtain private benefits of control, the theoretical analyses of Grossman and Hart (1988) and 
Harris and Raviv (1988) show that a one-share-one-vote equity structure is optimal as it 
minimizes the likelihood that a value-enhancing takeover would not be realized. In firms with 
dual-class equity, the controlling shareholders with the better management team do not 
always win in takeover bidding contests.  
Several empirical studies have confirmed the negative view on dual-class equity. The 
event study of Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) finds significantly negative announcement effects of 
dual-class recapitalizations on stock prices. A negative value impact of dual-class equity is 
also documented by Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) for firms in East Asia, by Lins 
(2003) for firms in 18 emerging markets and by Villalonga and Amit (2009) for firms in the 
U.S.. Examining the channels through which dual-class equity affects share prices, Masulis et 
al. (2009) show that firms with dual-class shares have higher CEO salaries and that 
shareholders value the firm’s cash, acquisitions and capital spending less than in firms with 
single-class equity. Thus, dual-class shares reduce firm value to (minority) shareholders as the 
CEO receives higher salaries and engages in more inefficient empire-building activities. 
Whereas endogeneity challenges the negative associations in the above-mentioned studies, 
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this study tries to replicate their findings using the exogenous variation of a natural 
experiment. Thus, we predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Dual-class shares decrease firm performance, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
Positive View on Dual-Class Shares 
The positive view on dual-class shares roots in the stewardship theory of management and in 
the assumption of myopic financial markets. Whereas the agency perspective assumes that 
controlling shareholders behave opportunistically at the costs of minority shareholders, the 
stewardship perspective (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) suggests that individual 
behavior is not simply guided by self-interest but by service to others. The higher the 
identification with the firm, the higher the intrinsic motivation to work toward the firm’s 
goals tends to be (Davis et al., 1997).  
According to the stewardship perspective, barriers to the market for corporate control in 
the form of dual-class shares are not necessarily bad. To the contrary, removing all barriers to 
the market for control could force otherwise diligent managers and controlling shareholders to 
concentrate only on the current share price and neglect long-term value creation. Dual-class 
shares enable controlling shareholders to repel attempts of unfriendly takeover by a relatively 
small investment in the equity of the firm. Specifically, firms may benefit from such an anti-
takeover device in two ways: First, dual-class shares encourage incumbent managers to invest 
in firm-specific human capital. Managers tend to be reluctant to make firm-specific 
investments if potential takeovers threaten their (future) employment (DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1985). Second, firms may benefit from dual-class shares if financial markets 
undervalue long-term investments and share prices do not fully reflect future cash flows 
prospects. In such a setting, knowledgeable raiders could take control of the firm at an 
unreasonably low price. Dual-class shares, however, allow the likewise knowledgeable 
controlling shareholders to prevail against raiders by a smaller investment in the equity of the 
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firm. The theoretical analyses of Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) show that dual-class equity is a 
value-enhancing equity structure if the firm’s activities are characterized by high near-term 
uncertainty defined as “intrinsically more valuable, but showing less signs of success in the 
near-term” (p. 316). Dual-class shares increase the probability that the incumbent has enough 
votes to prevail against any myopic rival and to continue the profitable but uncertain projects.  
Partch (1987) finds the announcement of plans to create limited voting common stock to 
have positive valuation effects. Lehn et al. (1990) and Dimitrov and Jain (2006) show that 
shareholders earn significantly higher returns following dual-class recapitalizations. Firms 
that change from single-class into a dual-class equity structure grow faster than control firms 
and do not suffer from increased managerial entrenchment. This study tries to replicate the 
positive associations between dual-class shares and firm performance found in previous 
studies by making use of a natural experiment. Thus, we predict that:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Dual-class shares increase firm performance, ceteris paribus.  
 
Need for External Finance as a Moderator  
As described in the previous two sections, the agency perspective highlights the detriments 
and the stewardship perspective the benefits of dual-class shares. Although each distinct 
research stream is individually compelling, elements of both perspectives are likely to be 
present in practice. The critical question is under what contextual factors do the benefits of 
dual-class equity described by the stewardship perspective outweigh the potential abuses 
described by the agency perspective? The inherent trade-off is unlikely to be the same for all 
firms. Rather, contextual factors are expected to intervene between dual-class equity and firm 
performance. Even though such a contingency view is essential for the equity structure to be a 
source of competitive advantage, only three empirical studies have taken a contingency view 
on dual-class equity so far (Masulis et al., 2009; Hoi and Robin, 2010, Bennedsen and 
Nielsen, 2010).  
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An important but underexposed contextual factor is the need for external finance. 
Referring to the seminal studies of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) we argue that a 
firm’s external financing needs attenuate the agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders.  
If the internally generated cash flow exceeds profitable investment opportunities, the firm 
does not need to obtain external finance, which weakens monitoring by the capital market. If 
a firm requires external finance and therefore issues new securities, however, the firm’s 
affairs will be rigorously reviewed. Because contributors of new capital can, unlike existing 
investors, refuse to invest money in the firm, controlling shareholders who need to raise 
money are more likely to act in the minority shareholders’ interests than controlling 
shareholders who are immune from this kind of scrutiny. A firm’s existing investors can 
influence actions only by voting (which suffers from a collective action problem) and by 
selling their shares (mostly at lower prices). All in all, external financing needs mitigate the 
agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders and create a context in which the 
benefits of dual-class shares are likely to outweigh the costs of dual-class shares. We 
therefore predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s need for external finance positively moderates the relation 
between dual-class shares and firm performance.  
 
BACKGROUND OF THE NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
Different Share Classes 
Swiss firms can issue three major classes of shares: registered shares (RS), bearer shares (BS), 
and non-voting shares (NVS). While all three classes of shares receive dividends that are 
proportional to their face values, only RS and BS possess voting rights, namely one vote each 
share. NVS (in German “Partizipationsscheine”) are not entitled to any voting rights. The 
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main difference between RS and BS is that the holders of BS remain anonymous to the firm 
whereas the buyers of RS have to be registered by the firm to claim the rights vested in the 
stock.  
 
Law Change 
On October 4, 1991, the Swiss Parliament passed a new corporation law (“Aktiengesetz”) that 
took effect on July 1, 1992. The new law caused an exogenous shock to the fraction of firms 
with NVS as it abolished three specific advantages of having NVS that can be described with 
the terms liquidity, protectionism, and financial flexibility.  
First, the new law required that all classes of shares have a minimum face value of 10 
CHF. It introduced a minimum face value for NVS and decreased the minimum face values 
for voting shares from 100 CHF to 10 CHF. Thus, firms could no longer increase share 
liquidity by issuing NVS with very low face values. Unlike with BS and RS, there had not 
been a minimum face value for NVS under the previous law. 
Second, the new corporation law significantly curtailed discrimination against unwanted 
investors and abolished nationality as a valid criterion for denying ownership to buyers of RS 
of listed firms. Protectionism used to be an important reason for creating dual-class equity in 
Switzerland. The previous corporation law had allowed Swiss firms to discriminate across 
investor type by rejecting prospective holders of RS without providing specific reasons. A 
frequently used criterion had been that shareholders had to be Swiss nationals. However, due 
to the limited financial power of Swiss investors, large firms had not been able to obtain 
sufficient domestic capital and therefore had frequently issued an unrestricted class of shares 
as well. Since NVS are not entitled to any voting rights, NVS had been particularly suitable 
for protective firms requiring external foreign capital. Under the new corporation law, firms 
can no longer seek non-voting foreign capital only. 
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Third, the new corporation law also removed financial flexibility as a reason for having 
NVS. Because NVS had not even been mentioned in the previous corporation law, firms had 
been able to issue and withdraw NVS in a very flexible manner. Unlike with voting shares, no 
shareholder approval had been needed when increasing non-voting stock and firms had been 
able to buy back their NVS whenever they wanted. Firms had not been allowed, however, to 
buy back their own voting shares. The new corporation law created more flexible ways to 
increase capital of voting stock and permitted buybacks of voting shares. In addition, the new 
law regulated NVS and designed them as shares with the same rights and duties as the voting 
shares except that they do not have voting rights.  
The new corporation law also limited the fraction of non-voting stock to a maximum of 
double the voting stock. But this regulation did not change much. Our data reveal only one 
firm for which the non-voting stock was more than double the voting stock. In addition, 
exception was granted for firms that had non-voting stock more than double the voting stock 
already in 1985 (grandfather clause).  
By removing the three previous advantages of having NVS (liquidity, protectionism, 
financial flexibility), the law change caused a substantial number of firms to abandon NVS. 
The decrease in the fraction of firms with NVS is considered as exogenous in a firm 
performance model because the reasons for abandoning NVS are not related to the efficiency 
arguments of dual-class shares outlined in the theoretical section. Firms had to ensure their 
bylaws complied with the new corporation law within five years, by June 30, 1997 at the 
latest. Since that date, the law has been strictly enforced and non-compliant firms could have 
been dissolved per curiam. Whereas the average fraction of listed Swiss firms with NVS was 
47 percent in 1990, it decreased to 23 percent by 1994.   
 
  
 12 
SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
This study uses yearly observations from publicly listed Swiss firms from 1989 to 1997. A 
firm’s equity structure, its largest shareholder and the firm’s age have been hand-collected 
from annual versions of the Swiss Stock Guide (“Aktienführer Schweiz”), which describe all 
listed firms in Switzerland, 345 unique firms and 2137 firm-year observations in total. Data 
on firm performance, external financing needs, firm size and other firm-specific variables are 
taken from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. In principle, Datastream provides 
historical data from the late 80s onward. However, data from the early years are less complete 
and historical data of firms that went bankrupt or were acquired are often missing. 
We merged the two data sets based on firm name and year. As name formats may differ 
between the two data sources, firm names had to be cleaned. In addition, we had to manually 
check whether a firm name might have changed. After that, we were able to merge 
correspondent Datastream data for 196 firms and 1242 firm-year observations.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
As our sample does not cover all of the listed firms in Switzerland, non-random sample 
selection could bias our results. In Table 1 we assess the representativeness of our sample. 
While firms with NVS are slightly overrepresented in our sample, the difference in means is 
not statistically significant. The mean age of the firms in our sample is also statistically 
indistinguishable from that of all firms listed on the Swiss stock market in that period of time. 
Overall, our sample seems to be representative of the Swiss stock market. It includes both big 
firms with a global coverage like ABB, Nestle, Novartis, Roche, and UBS and medium sized 
(family) firms.  
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Dependent Variables 
We measure firm performance in two ways: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. ROA is a 
standard accounting measure of financial performance commonly found in corporate 
governance and strategy research (e.g., Jog et al., 2010) and is calculated by dividing annual 
earnings before interest by average total firm assets. We use Tobin’s q in addition to ROA, 
because Tobin’s q better reflects the future profit and growth potential of a firm. We 
calculated Tobin’s q by dividing the sum of the market value of a firm’s equity and the book 
value of its debt by the book value of total assets.  
We follow the related literature (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Jog et al., 2010) and adjust 
firm performance measures by industry specific time trends. Specifically, we deduct from the 
firm’s ROA and Tobin’s q the value-weighted industry average of Tobin’s q and ROA, 
respectively. As industry classifications, we use the first digit of the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (www.icbenchmark.com).  
 
Instrument, Intervening and Moderating Variables 
We measure the existence of dual-class shares using a dummy variable 𝑁𝑉𝑆!" that equals 1 if 
a firm has NVS in a given year and 0 otherwise. As argued in the introduction, a simple 
regression relating firm performance to its equity structure is likely to be confounded by 
omitted variables that may affect both the firm’s equity structure and performance. The 
standard textbook solution to mitigating the endogeneity problem is to use instrumental 
variables estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). Adequate instruments are hard to find, however. In 
this study, we make use of the law change that decreased the convenience of NVS to 
construct an instrument. Specifically, we employ the dichotomous variable  𝐿𝑎𝑤!" as 
instrument for dual-class equity.  𝐿𝑎𝑤!" equals 1 for affected firms (i.e., firms with NVS in 
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1991) in the post-policy period (between 1992 and 1997).3 As the results of the first-stage 
regressions will show,  𝐿𝑎𝑤!" is an important negative predictor of dual-class shares.  
To test whether the influence of dual-class shares on firm performance depends on a 
firm’s external financing needs, we include an interaction term of the predicted values of 
dual-class equity from the first-stage regression and a proxy of a firm’s external financing 
needs. A firm requires external finance if the investment opportunities exceed internal cash 
flow. To measure a firm’s internal cash flow and its optimal investment level, we follow the 
approach established by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and applied by Durnev and 
Kim (2005) and Chen, Chung, Hsu, and Wu (2010). They define external financing needs as 
the difference between the firm’s actual growth rate and the sustainable growth rate. The 
actual growth rate of a firm is defined as the annual growth rate in total assets. The 
sustainable growth rate is defined as the growth rate attainable if the firm does not pay 
dividends and receives just enough debt financing to maintain a constant debt-to-assets ratio. 
Under these assumptions, the sustainable growth rate equals ROE/(1-ROE), where ROE is net 
income over book equity (see Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998, and Durnev & Kim, 
2005, for a detailed derivation of this formula). If the difference between actual growth rate 
and the sustainable growth rate is positive, the firm needs external finance. If the difference is 
negative, the firm generates more internal funds than needed to finance firm growth. To avoid 
endogeneity issues we use the difference between the actual and sustainable growth rates 
from the previous year to measure a firm’s external financing needs. 
We prefer this proxy of a firm’s reliance on external finance to the free cash flow proxy 
suggested by Brush, Bomiley, and Hendrickx (2000). Based on the seminal work of Lang, 
Stulz, and Walking (1991), Brush et al. (2000) argue that free cash flow equals cash flow 
(operating income before depreciation, minus interest expense, taxes, and dividends) for firms 
                                                
 
3  The instrumental variable 𝐿𝑎𝑤!" is set to 0 for firms that did not exist or were not listed in 1991.   
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with Tobin’s q below 1, but is zero for firms with Tobin’s q above 1, because firms with 
Tobin’s q above 1 have profitable investment opportunities in theory. While such a measure 
of free cash flow may be appropriate in models of sales growth (see Brush et al., 2000), it 
causes significant endogeneity issues in firm performance models (see also Lang et al., 1991, 
for limitations of the free cash flow proxy).   
 
Control Variables 
Adequate instruments have to significantly influence the endogenous variable, but must not 
be correlated with the structural error term. Whereas the first condition can be tested by the F-
statistics of the identifying instrument 𝐿𝑎𝑤!" in a regression explaining the endogenous 
variable, there is no empirical test for the second condition because of the unobservability of 
the structural error term.4 The instrument must be uncorrelated with the dependent variable in 
the second-stage equation, except through variables that are included in the equation. Thus, 
we have to diligently check the control variables.  
We remove confounding influences by controlling for factors that may correlate with 
both the instrument   𝐿𝑎𝑤!" and firm performance. Previous literature has shown that firm 
performance is negatively related to a firm’s external financing needs (Chen et al., 2010), firm 
age (Loderer & Wälchli, 2010), firm size (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Hoi & Robin, 2010), 
and positively related to research intensity (Hoi & Robin, 2010), firm leverage (Jog et al., 
2010), and family firm status (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). As such observable characteristics 
may differ between firms affected by the law change and firms unaffected, we include a 
firm’s external financing needs, firm age (number of years since incorporation, transformed 
by logarithm), firm size (firm’s assets, transformed by logarithm), the ratio of research and 
                                                
 
4  If the number of instruments exceeded the number of endogenous variables, tests of over-identifying 
restrictions (Hansen, 1982) could be applied to examine the second condition. This test requires, however, 
that at least one of the instruments is valid (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). As we have a perfectly identified 
model, tests for over-identifying restrictions are anyway not possible in our case.  
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development (R&D) expenditures to net sales, firm leverage (debt to equity ratio) and a 
dummy variable indicating family firms (dummy variable equaling 1 if largest shareholder 
holds more than 50% of the votes) as controls. To take common time trends of dual-class 
equity into account we also include year fixed effects. 
To avoid problems with outlying observations, we winsorize all variables at the 5st and 
the 95th percentile. Following Miller et al. (2007) we coded missing values for R&D to sales 
as 0. All variables (except binary variables) are standardized to increase the interpretability of 
the estimates and to reduce multicollinearity of the interaction variables. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the (unstandardized) variables. The firms in our 
sample have an average ROA of 4.48 percent and a Tobin’s q of 1.19. The average fraction of 
firm-year observations with NVS is 34 percent. On average, firms generate just sufficient 
internal funds to finance firm growth (mean of the external financing needs variable is 0). The 
standard deviation of 0.20 indicates that some firms generate more and other firms less 
internal funds than needed. Mean log firm age is 3.69 (40 years) and mean log assets 13.70 
(around 890 million CHF). R&D expenditures correspond to 0.78 percent of sales and the 
leverage ratio is 4.08, on average. The fraction of family firm observations is 69%.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Table 3 compares firms with NVS (affected firms) to firms without NVS (unaffected 
firms) in 1991, one year before the law change. Firms with and without NVS did not 
significantly differ in firm performance. Firms with and without NVS had very similar 
external financing needs. Affected firms were, however, older and larger than unaffected 
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firms. Whereas the R&D expenditures to sales ratio and the leverage ratio were not 
significantly different in affected and unaffected firms, family firms were slightly 
underrepresented in the group of firms with NVS.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The (partly) significant differences between affected and unaffected firms confirm the 
importance of controlling for the observable factors that previous studies found to influence 
performance. By controlling for a firm’s external financing needs, firm age, assets, R&D 
expenditures to sales ratio, leverage ratio and family firm status we remove confounding 
influences based on these observable firm characteristics.  
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
A potential problem is that our controls only partly cover all relevant firm characteristics. 
Larger firms may have different firm cultures, business strategies and managerial quality than 
smaller firms, for example. As larger firms are also more likely to have NVS and therefore to 
be affected by the law change, performance comparisons of affected and unaffected firms 
may be biased even when controlling for observable factors such as a firm’s total assets. To 
control for the possibility of unobserved time-invariant determinants of firm performance 
such as firm cultures, we make use of the panel dimension of our data. Formally, we 
decompose the structural error term (𝜖!") into a firm-specific disturbance (𝑢!) and an 
independent and identically distributed error term (𝜀!") so that 𝜖!" = 𝑢! + 𝜀!".  
F tests following fixed-effects regressions indicate that there is a significant firm-specific 
disturbance (F-statistics are between 4.5 and 12.6, p<0.001), implying that the method of 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is inappropriate. The firm-specific disturbance can be 
either fixed over time for each firm (fixed-effects model), or vary randomly over time for 
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each firm (random-effects model). To decide whether the firm-level effects are random or 
fixed, we performed the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) that compares the fixed-
effects estimates with the random-effects estimates. Whereas the fixed-effects model allows 
the firm-level effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables, the random-effects 
model assumes strict orthogonality. The Hausman specification test rejects the orthogonality 
assumption at high levels of statistical significance, which suggests that a random-effects 
model inadequately describes firm-level effects.  
By using a firm fixed-effects model, we control for the possibility of unobservable time-
constant determinants of performance. Essentially, we compare the performance changes of 
firms that abandoned NVS due to the law change with the performance changes of firms that 
did not abandon NVS; regression adjusted for observable time-varying determinants of firm 
performance and common time trends. Inference is based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level to take serial error correlations across firm observations into account 
(Peterson, 2009). The estimates are unbiased as long as the law change is uncorrelated to 
unobserved time trends of confounding variables. Confounding factors that could change over 
time are managerial quality or the firm’s main business strategy, for example. However, we 
see no special patterns in CEO dismissals around 1992 and it is very unlikely that the altered 
regulations of NVS caused firms to change their main business strategy.  
 
Regression Results 
In a first step we predict a firm’s NVS with the identifying instrument and the control 
variables (including firm fixed effects). In a second step we relate the predicted values of the 
first-stage regressions to firm performance. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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Table 4 reports the results. p-values based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering (Peterson, 2009) are reported in 
parentheses. Model 1 shows the estimates of the first-stage regression. The instrument 𝐿𝑎𝑤!" (equaling 1 for firms with NVS in 1991 for observations after 1991, 0 otherwise) is a 
strong negative predictor. The fraction of firms with NVS decreased by 43 percent for 
affected firms in the after-policy period, controlling for time-varying controls and time-
constant firm heterogeneity. The partial R2 value of 0.14 of the identifying instrument 
documents the relevance of our instrument when explaining 𝑁𝑉𝑆!" (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 
1995). The F-statistic (70.13, p < 0.001) is far above the critical value of 8.96 (Larker & 
Rusticus, 2010). 
The predicted values from the first-stage regressions are used as explanatory variables in 
the second-stage regressions. Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 report the results when testing 
hypotheses 1 and 2 of universal effects of dual-class equity on firm performance. The effects 
of the predicted values of 𝑁𝑉𝑆!", are negative when using the industry-adjusted ROA as 
performance measure and positive when using the industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as performance 
measure. However, the effects are not statistically different from zero. Thus, neither 
Hypothesis 1, predicting a negative performance effect of dual-class shares, nor Hypothesis 2, 
predicting a positive performance effect of dual-class shares, is supported. The effects of the 
control variables are mostly insignificant. Exceptions are the effects of external financing 
needs and the leverage ratio (significantly negative effects on ROA) and firm assets 
(significantly negative effect on Tobin’s q).  
Models 4 and 5 in Table 4 show the results of a specification that additionally includes an 
interaction term of the predicted values of 𝑁𝑉𝑆!" and a firm’s external financing needs. The 
coefficients of the interaction term are significantly positive in both models. As the interaction 
variables are mean-centered and as the mean of the external financing needs variable is 0, a 
positive interaction effect implies that dual-class shares increase firm performance if the firm 
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needs external finance (external financing variable above 0), and that dual-class shares 
decrease firm performance if the firm does not need external finance (external financing 
needs variable below 0).5 Thus, Hypothesis 3 predicting that a firm’s external financing needs 
positively moderate the relation between dual-class shares and performance is confirmed. The 
effects of the control variables and the direct effect of dual-class equity do not change in any 
significant way when including the interaction term.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study uses a law change to explore the causal effect of dual-class shares on firm 
performance. Performance effects are identified based on panel data of both firms affected 
and unaffected by the law change, taking unobserved firm heterogeneity and time-varying 
controls into account. We find that dual-class shares increase firm performance if a firm needs 
external finance and decrease firm performance if a firm does not need external finance, 
leading to an insignificant universal effect.  
How can these findings be explained? Given that dual-class shares, as most corporate 
governance practices, have both advantages and disadvantages, insignificant universal 
performance effects should be no surprise (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008). 
The positive and negative effects could simply neutralize each other. But why do external 
financing needs create a context in which the advantages of dual-class equity outweigh the 
disadvantages of dual-class equity?  
Excess internal funds insulate controlling shareholders from the monitoring of the capital 
market. The weak monitoring of the capital market intensifies the agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and thereby also intensifies the 
                                                
 
5  To test for potential non-linearity of the interaction effect, we conducted subsample analyses. The 
performance effects of the predicted values of dual-class equity are insignificant when estimated separately 
for a subsample of firms with external financing needs and a subsample of firms without external financing 
needs. However, as the cases-to-variables ratio is far below 10, the statistical power of the subgroup analyses 
is low.  
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disadvantages of dual-class equity. By holding shares with superior voting rights and by 
having sufficient internal cash flow to fund all firm projects, controlling shareholders are 
unlikely to be replaced by rivals or disciplined by the capital market. The coexistence of dual-
class equity and excess internal funds therefore facilitates private rent extractions and 
inefficient empire-building activities by controlling shareholders at the cost of minority 
shareholders.  
If profitable investment opportunities exceed internal cash flow, the situation is quite 
different. As the firm needs external finance, controlling shareholders are under much 
stronger market discipline and have less leeway to pursue their own objectives. This reduces 
conflicts of interests between controlling and minority shareholders regardless of whether 
dual-class equity exists or not. In fact, our results indicate that fast growing firms may benefit 
from dual-class equity as an anti-takeover device that encourages stable ownership and firm-
specific investments.   
This study contributes to the existing literature in three key aspects: We are the first to 
address the endogeneity of dual-class equity by making use of a natural experiment. The 
unique law change in Switzerland created an exogenous shock to equilibrium governance 
practices. Thus, the “within equilibrium” criticism (Larcker et al., 2011) does not apply to this 
study. Second, while previous research has mostly investigated universal performance effects 
of dual-class shares (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Jog et al., 2010), this study emphasizes a 
contingency view on dual-class equity. Such a contingency view is indispensable for an 
equity structure to create a competitive advantage. Third, the finding that a firm’s external 
financing needs positively moderate the relationship between dual-class shares and firm 
performance sheds a fresh light on a related study by Chen et al. (2010). They argue that firms 
with external financing needs tend to have better governance practices because improvements 
in corporate governance reduce the costs of raising external capital. They find significantly 
positive interaction effects of external financing needs and a general governance quality index 
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on firm performance.6 Even though dual-class equity is commonly considered as weak 
corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2010), we show that this is not true for fast growing 
firms with external financing needs. The performance of such firms benefits from dual-class 
equity as it shields them from potential hostile takeovers and enables the controlling 
shareholders (usually the founders) to pursue a long-term value creation strategy.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Despite these contributions, this study has some caveats or limitations that need future 
research to enhance its key arguments. First, as the identification strategy is based on a unique 
law change in Switzerland, future studies should replicate this study in other countries to test 
the generalizability of our results. Second, our empirical strategy delivers estimates of the 
effectiveness of abandoning NVS in response to a law change that removed comparative 
advantages of NVS. Using only the within-firm variation, we cannot determine whether the 
firms that did not change their equity structure were guided by rent extraction or value 
maximization considerations. We simply know that, on average, the performance trend of 
“changers” was very similar to the performance trend of “stayers”. Third, some of our 
empirical analyses are constrained by the availability of the data. Future studies with access to 
more detailed data could test additional moderators related, for example, to the composition 
of the management team. As founding families tend to identify very strongly with “their” 
firm, the stewardship theory conjectures that the presence of family members in the 
management team should enhance the benefits of dual-class equity. Previous evidence on this 
topic (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Hoi & Robin, 2010) is inconclusive.  
 
  
                                                
 
6  As Chen et al. (2010) use a corporate governance index that is inversely coded with a large value indicating 
poor corporate governance quality, the interaction effect is in fact negative.  
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Managerial Implications 
The results of this study have clear managerial implications. Dual-class shares are not 
suitable for firms with low long-term growth, for which internally generated funds exceed 
opportunities to invest them profitably. Such firms should create a one-share-one-vote 
structure to reduce the risk of private rent extractions by controlling shareholders. However, 
fast growing firms that need external finance to fund their projects should create dual-class 
equity to promote stable ownership and firm specific investments. The capital market 
mitigates the agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders for such firms 
and both parties benefit from dual-class equity as an anti-takeover device.  
From a policy perspective, the results of this study indicate that policy makers do well to 
not prohibit dual-class shares in general. As the performance consequences of dual-class 
shares depend on firm characteristics such as the need for external finance, there is no one-
size-fits-all approach. 
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Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.)
Number of firms
Number of firm-year observations
Non-voting sharesit (NVSit) 0.312 (0.010) 0.339 (0.013) 1.64
Firm ageit 67.70 (1.23) 66.32 (1.74) -0.64
Source: Annual versions of the Swiss Stock Guides 1989 to 1997, own calculations. The table reports 
descriptive statistics of all listed Swiss firms between 1989 and 1997 and of the sampled firms. 
Significance levels are denoted by *** 0.1 percent, ** 1 percent, * 5 percent, † 10 percent (two-tailed 
tests). 
2137
All firms
TABLE 1
Representativeness of the Sample
196
1242
Sampled firms
t-stat.
345
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Variables Mean s.d. Min Max
ROAit (10
2) 4.48 3.50 -1.14 12.41
Tobin's qit 1.19 0.37 0.79 2.24
Non-voting sharesit (NVSit) 0.34 0.00 1.00
External financing needsit-1 0.00 0.20 -0.34 0.55
Log firm ageit 3.69 1.08 1.10 5.00
Log assets it 13.70 1.63 10.87 16.98
Research & developmentit / sales it  (in 10
-2) 0.78 1.72 0.00 5.70
Leverage ratioit 4.08 5.52 0.33 20.09
Family firmit 0.69 0.00 1.00
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
analyses. The sample includes 196 firms and 1242 firm-year observations. 
Descriptive Statistics
TABLE 2
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Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Industry-adjusted ROAit (10
2) -0.74 0.38 -0.04 0.41 1.27
Industry-adjusted Tobin's qit 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.06 1.56
Non-voting sharesit (NVSit) 1.00 0.00
External financing needsit-1 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.31
Log firm ageit 3.94 0.13 3.32 0.15 -3.19 **
Log assets it 14.08 0.19 13.19 0.19 -3.23 **
Research & developmentit / sales it  (10
2) 0.37 0.15 0.72 0.21 1.38
Leverage ratioit 4.50 0.66 4.43 0.78 -0.07
Family firmit 0.70 0.06 0.82 0.05 1.66 †
Firms with NVS 
(affected)
Firms without NVS 
(unaffected)
t-statistic for 
difference
TABLE 3
Comparison of Firms With and Without NVS in 1991
The table reports the means and the standard errors of the means of the variables used in the regression analyses of 
firms with and without NVS in 1991 (i.e., one year before the law change). The calculations are based on 69 firms with 
NVS and 66 firms without NVS. Paired sample t-test are used to compare means of affected firms to means of unaffected 
firms. Significance levels are denoted by *** 0.1 percent, ** 1 percent, * 5 percent, † 10 percent (two-tailed tests). 
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1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variables NVSit
Ind.-adj. 
ROAit
Ind.-adj. 
Tobin's qit
Ind.-adj. 
ROAit
Ind.-adj. 
Tobin's qit
-0.43***
(0.000)
-0.21 0.03 -0.18 0.03
(0.320) (0.337) (0.382) (0.310)
0.32*** 0.02*
(0.000) (0.033)
External financing needsit-1 0.01 -0.37*** -0.004 -0.40*** -0.01
(0.412) (0.000) (0.582) (0.000) (0.449)
Log firm ageit 0.02 0.18 -0.003 0.31 0.003
(0.639) (0.630) (0.919) (0.418) (0.940)
Log assets it 0.09 -0.11 -0.25** 0.01 -0.25**
(0.198) (0.839) (0.006) (0.983) (0.007)
Research & developmentit / sales it -0.04 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.03
(0.108) (0.422) (0.162) (0.455) (0.170)
Leverage ratioit 0.03 -0.68+ -0.02 -0.80* -0.03
(0.308) (0.068) (0.539) (0.026) (0.422)
Family firmit -0.04* 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.02
(0.160) (0.340) (0.389) (0.286) (0.365)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Shea partial R2 of excluded instrument 0.14
F-statistic of excluded instrument 70.13***
Number of observations 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242
Number of firms 196 196 196 196 196
R2 (within) 0.39 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.12
Lawit (=1 for firms with NVS in 1991 for 
observations after 1991, =0 otherwise)
NVSit (predicted values)* External financing 
needsit-1
NVSit (predicted values)
The table reports OLS estimates of the first-stage regression in column 1 and of the second-stage regressions in columns 2 
to 5. In parentheses are p -values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm 
clustering (Peterson, 2009). All variables (except binary variables) are standardized to increase the interpretabilitiy of the 
estimates and to reduce multicollinearity of the interaction variables. Significance levels are denoted by *** 0.1 percent, ** 1 
percent, * 5 percent,  + 10 percent (two-tailed tests). 
The Relationship between Dual-Class Shares and Firm Performance
TABLE 4
